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NOTE
THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SUICIDE *
Judicial assumptions about the nature and frequency of suicide underly
a number of evidentiary and substantive rules, but the reported opinions
indicate that only rarely have these assumptions been derived from a
thorough and informed examination of the subject. The casualness of the
judicial approach to suicide is paralleled by the subject's neglect in scientific
literature.1  While statistical studies of suicide 2 have interested numerous
writers, particularly life insurance authorities,8 neither the actuaries nor
the sociologists have formulated comprehensive and systematic hypotheses
as to the causes of suicide.4  The chief advances in the knowledge of suicide
have come through the psychoanalysts.5 Even they, however, have studied
the intention to commit suicide much more than the act itself." Notwith-
standing such limitations, it is submitted that legal assumptions about
suicide may be made sounder by critical reference to the existing studies.
Accordingly, this Note will examine, in the light of sociological and
psychoanalytic findings, four situations in which judicial assumptions about
• Based on materials from LEVIN, EVIDENCE AND THE BEHAVIORAL ScIENCES
(mimeo. 1956). These materials were prepared with the participation of the following
consultants from a project on Law and Behavioral Science of which evidence is one
phase, being conducted at the University of Pennsylvania Law School under a grant
from the National Institute of Mental Health: Andrew S. Watson, M.D. (project
co-director) ; M. E. Bitterman, Ph.D.; Richard G. Longsdorf, M.D.; Julius Wishner,
Ph.D.; Marvin E. Wolfgang, Ph.D.
1. See MnNNINGER, MAN AGINST HImtSLr 13 (1938) (hereinafter cited as
MtNNINOGR), where the limited extent of study is offered as evidence of a taboo asso-
ciated with the subject. See also Simpson, Introduction to DURKHIm, Suicmn (1951).
2. Such studies are admittedly subject to a large element of error due to the un-
reliability of available primary data, since all too many suicides are not reported as
such. Those who kill themselves through automobile accidents are almost never re-
corded as suicides; those who sustain serious injuries and die weeks or months later
are rarely registered as suicides; a great many suicides are concealed by families, and
suicidal attempts, no matter how serious, are even less likely to find their way into
tables of vital statistics. Zilboorg, Suicide Among Civilized and Primitive Races, 92
Am. J. PsYcH. (1936) ; DuBLIN, TH FA Cts op Lig4 259 (1951).
3. See, e.g., id. at 259-65. For a compendium of actuarial works, see BUNZZ1, To
Bt OR NoT To Bx (1933).
4. The actuaries have studied the overall extent and trends of suicide, and related
it to race and color incidence, age and sex distribution, urban and rural areas, season-
ality, economic conditions, religious affiliations, marital status and method. See, e.g.,
DuBmIN, op. cit. supra note 2; Schmid & Van Arsdol, Completed and Attempted Sui-
cides: A Comparative Analysis, 20 Am. Soc. rv. 273 (1955).
5. This seems to be acknowledged even by the sociologists. Cf. Simpson, supra
note 1.
6. MtNNINGER 16. Suicide is an extremely infrequent event, and very few of those
patients who express suicide thoughts actually commit suicide. Rosen, Detection of
Suicidal Patients: An Example of Some Limitations in the Prediction of Infrequent
Events, 18 J. CoNsuIm. PsYcH. 397 (1954).
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suicide are crucial: First, where the prosecution in a criminal trial offers
evidence of the accused's attempted suicide to show that he was conscious
of his guilt or that he desired to escape deserved punishment. Second,
where a homicide defendant, in an effort to prove that the alleged victim
committed suicide, presents evidence that the deceased had under previous
circumstances threatened suicide. Third, where the defendant in a criminal
trial attempts to introduce as exculpating evidence statements contained
in the suicide note of a third person; or where the prosecution seeks to
introduce a third person's suicide note to inculpate the defendant. Finally,
where the petitioner in a workmen's compensation proceeding seeks to
prove that physical injuries in the course of employment proximately
caused the worker's subsequent suicide.
No illusions should be entertained as to the conclusiveness of much
of the data here presented. The psychoanalytic findings, in particular, have
not been thoroughly tested by empirical, experimental or semi-experimental
investigations.7 However, it should be emphasized that the views reflected
in this data receive support from all psychiatric schools. An extensive
investigation of the literature indicates that the vast majority of psychiatrists
-Freudian, neo-Freudian or anti-Freudian-who attempt a dynamic un-
derstanding of the individual, substantially agree with these interpretations
of suicide motivations.8
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF THE ATTEMPTED SUICIDE
OF THE AccusED
Where the accused in a criminal case attempts suicide between the
time of the alleged crime and the trial, the prosecution may be anxious to
have this conduct admitted as evidence against the defendant. Whether
the prosecution may do so has been at issue in the reported opinions of
at least nine jurisdictions. 9 In these cases, virtually all of the defendants
were, at the time of their suicide attempts, in confinement awaiting trials
for murder.'0 Evidence of the attempt was uniformly admitted and doubt-
7. It has been suggested that this is because until recent years experimental tech-
niques were not sufficiently developed to study the kinds of behavior to which Freud
applied himself. SEARS, SURV Y o ORJZCTsv, SruDIs o PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPTS
ix (1943). Nevertheless, in some instances Freud's views have been supported and his
principles significantly extended. See, e.g., id. at 81-94, 137-39, on fixation and regres-
sion, a process referred to in text at notes 23-24 infra. In other instances objective
techniques appear to have cast doubt on Freudian views. See, e.g., Orlansky, Infant
Care & Personality, 46 PsYcH. BULL. 1 (1949), on the effect of certain features of
infant care upon personality.
8. LEVIN, EVIDENCg AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENcES C-8 (mimeo. 1956).
9. State v. Hargraves, 62 Idaho 8, 107 P.2d 854 (1940) ; State v. Bittner, 209 Iowa
109, 227 N.W. 601 (1929) ; Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 315 Mass. 26, 51 N.E.2d 762
(1943) ; State v. Painter, 329 Mo. 314, 44 S.W.2d 79 (1931) ; State v. Plunkett, 62
Nev. 265, 149 P.2d 101 (1944) ; State v. Jaggers, 71 N.J.L. 281, 58 At. 1014 (1904) ;
State v. Blancett, 24 N.M. 433, 174 Pac. 207 (1918) ; State v. Marsh, 234 N.C. 101, 66
S.E.2d 684 (1951); State v. Exum, 213 N.C. 16, 195 S.E. 7 (1939); State v. Law-
rence, 196 N.C. 562, 146 S.E. 395 (1929) ; Commonwealth v. Giacobbe, 341 Pa. 187, 19
A.2d 71 (1941).
10. The defendants in State v. Plunkett, supra note 9 and Commonwealth v. Gia-
cobbe, supra note 9, were execeptions.
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less considered by the jury in finding the defendants guilty.1 On appeal
defendants averred such admission to be erroneous, generally relying on
State v. Coudotte.12  There the prosecution's case rested upon the testi-
mony of two confessed accomplices. By statute such evidence would not
support a conviction without corroborating evidence tending to connect
defendant with the commission of the offense. The court, holding that evi-
dence of the attempted suicide did not constitute sufficient corroboration, did
not pass upon its admissibility generally. Restricting the Coudotte case to
this narrow holding and analogizing evidence of suicide to that of flight,
which is admissible as tending to show consciousness of guilt and a desire
to escape punishment, the appellate courts in each jurisdiction in which the
question has arisen have held evidence of attempted suicide properly
admitted.
An opposite view was advanced almost thirty years ago 13 by the
now Dean Fordham, suggesting that such evidence generally is not logically
relevant and should therefore be excluded. He pointed out that relevance
premises that an accused who attempts suicide is more likely to be guilty
than one who does not attempt suicide.1 4  This premise might have been
demonstrated by statistics showing that a larger ratio of accused persons
who attempt suicide are guilty than of those who do not attempt it. How-
ever, no such statistics were available. This premise might also have been
demonstrated by a determination that the dominant motive underlying
attempted suicide in this situation is consciousness of guilt or a desire to
escape deserved punishment,' 5 rather than any of numerous other motives.
However, since ordinary human experience in such matters was too limited
to indicate which motive was in fact dominant, and the paucity of learned
literature on suicidal behavior rendered impossible at that time any expert
appraisal of the question, it was concluded that the evidence could not
properly be admitted. More complete expert understanding of the subject
today dictates the same conclusion, notwithstanding an unbroken line of
legal authority to the contrary.
The immediate causes of suicide are probably as numerous and varied
as the number of people who commit the act. The layman is accustomed
to recognizing hardships of various kinds, such as loss of employment,
physical injury, ill health, loss of status or love as triggering self-destruc-
tion.16 However, it is perhaps less willingly recognized that a characteristic
11. Since the state seldom may, and rarely does, appeal an acquittal, the reports
do not contain cases in which attempted suicide by the accused was in evidence and
a verdict of acquittal was rendered.
12. 7 N.D. 109, 72 N.W. 913 (1897).
13. Note, 7 N.C.L. REv. 290 (1929).
14. Cf. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy, 5 VAND. L. Rmv. 385, 388 (1952):
"Fact A will be said to be logically relevant to fact B when, according to human ex-
perience, it is so related to fact B that fact A, considered either by itself or in connec-
tion with other facts, renders probable the past or future existence or non-existence of
fact B."
15. Cf. McCoRMICK, EVmDXNcz 318-19 (1954) (hereinafter cited as McCoRmiicc)
(discussing attempted suicide during confinement awaiting trial for murder).
16. See, e.g., 14 ENCYCLOPZDIA OP ' Ir SocIAL SczNczs, Suicide 456, 458 (1937).
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of many suicides is the apparent inadequacy of the precipitating event.' 7
For example, a girl killed herself, having become depressed after bobbing
her hair; a man killed himself, having been forced to quit playing golf; a
woman committed suicide after missing two trains; a boy took his life
when his pet canary died.' 8 The list could be extended almost in-
definitely. Moreover, most laymen would probably resist the suggestion
that suicidally-disposed personalities react suicidally not only to hardship
but also to good fortune. Both psychological 19 and sociological 20 studies,
however, have established that suicide frequently immediately follows an
increase in income, a promotion or a sudden self-realization of importance
and prestige.
To understand how apparently inadequate events may precipitate
suicide, one must look beyond the events immediately preceding the act.
The psychiatrist classically attributes suicide in Western culture 2 ' to the
operation of long-developed aggressive and guilt feelings in an emotionally
immature person.2 More specifically, it is regarded as based character-
istically on an individual's fixation to infantile behavior patterns,2 including
a tendency to react to frustration with violence and to fulfill desires by
ingratiation and submissiveness.2 4 It might be expected that because of
his exaggerated reaction to frustration, the classic suicidal type would
respond to threats to his self-esteem with the feeling that he is no longer
respected or even that he is hated. However, it is characteristic of such
an individual's immature state that his self-esteem is completely regulated
by the approval or disapproval of other people 25 or by the judgments of
his conscience.26 The control over this individual exercised by his con-
science or the frustrating person renders him powerless to express overtly
17. MENNINoER 39.
18. Ibid.; New Reasons for Suicide, 74 CURRENT OPINION 728 (1923).
19. FENICHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS 390-91 (1945) (here-
inafter cited as FNICHL) ; MXNNINGrR 45-47.
20. DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 243 (1951).
21. In other societies, under certain circumstances, suicide may be socially ap-
proved or even required. See 2 WSTRMARcK, THE ORIGIN AND DEVzLOPmENT OF
MORAL IDEAS c. 35 (1906) ; DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 219 (1951). See also State v. Cou-
dotte, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N.W. 913 (1897); Zilboorg, Differential Diagnostic Types of
Suicide, 75 ARCH. NnUROL. & PSYCH. 270 (1936).
22. Clinical experience indicates that the majority of suicides are of the type de-
scribed. BRILL, FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 262 (1921); Bergler,
Suicide: Psychoanalytic and Medicolegal Aspects, 8 LA. L. REv. 504, 622 (1948);
Lonsdorf, The Psychodynamics of Suicide, in LEVIN, EVIDENCE AND THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES C-7, C-8 (mimeo. 1956). Other types are possible. See, e.g., the descriptions
in MENNINGER 47; Lewis, Studies on Suicides, 21 PSYCH. REv. 146-49 (1934).
23. "Clinical observation has established the fact that such individuals are emo-
tionally or psychologically immature in that they have never graduated completely from
the infantile modes of love and being loved." MENNINGtR 39. See also note 7 supra.
24. Fr zICHXL 387; M4NNINGrR 39-46.
25. Cf. FENICECL 387.
26. The conscience is viewed as having developed through the individual's child-
hood identification with his parents' attitudes, opinions and judgments. ALEXANDER,
FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 85 (1948). In a suicidally-inclined individual
there appears to be an enormous over-development of the conscience with consequently
inexorable and inflexible demands on him. MENNINGER 52.
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his rage against that person,2 7 and he instead turns it against himself.28
Experience has taught us that when a person is full of rage and is unable
to vent it on others, he often takes it out on himself,2 9 .but the suicidal
patient may actually report, "I am bad because I am a murderer," when
he wants to say, "I am angry with X; he has treated me as if he wanted to
murder me." 30 As a result, following a threat to his self-esteem, such a
person instead of feeling that he is hated tends to feel that he is not hated
as much as he should be, and that his reasons for so judging himself are not
sufficiently apparent to others.3 1 Thus, not rage, but a guilt feeling is
experienced.
In acting suicidally this individual not only turns against himself a
violent reaction to frustration, but also attempts, consciously or uncon-
sciously, to control his environment by stimulating sympathy and guilt feel-
ings in other people.3 2  This element is most apparent in unsuccessful
suicide attempts,3 3 but even in these the self-destructive elements are ap-
parent and the question may legitimately be asked why these individuals
could find no better way to control environment than through an act of
self-destruction. The aggressive hostility and underlying guilt seem to be
the answers.
The feelings of guilt are not usually involved with obvious immediately
preceding events, although these events may, by threatening self-esteem,
increase hostility and guilt and so lead to the suicide attempt.34  It there-
fore becomes less difficult to explain both the apparent inadequacy and the
myriad kinds of the events which have precipitated suicide.35
27. MNNINGmR 37-38. Thwarting in the implementation of direct aggression may
also be the result of weakening from the admixture of erotic elements. This simply
means that we find it exceedingly difficult to kill someone we love. See FtNIcHmL 396-
97.
28. Ibid. The turning against the ego was discovered by Freud in analyzing the
self-reproaches of depressed patients. 4 FR -D, COLLECTED PAPFRS c. 8 (1924). Ap-
parently meaningless self-reproachful statements proved to have meaning if the name
of the hated object was substituted for "I." The self-reproaches were originally re-
proaches against the object The bad characteristics of an object which one dares not
become aware of because one fears the hatred they would arouse are perceived in one's
own self instead. The depressed patient says, "I am bad because I am a liar" when he
wants to say, "I am angry with X because he has lied to me"; or "I am bad because
I am a murderer" when he wants to say, "I am angry with X; he has treated me badly
as if he wanted to murder me."
29. SAuL, EmoTioNAL MATURITY c. 11 (1947).
30. See note 28 supra.
31. FgNicHxm 392, 397-98.
32. L~vIN, EvMNCg AND THP, BnHAVIORAL ScrmNcps C-8 (mimeo. 1956).
33. Attempts and even insincere gestures at suicide are generally regarded as in-
volving the same psychodynamics as the successful act Fisch, The Suicidal Gesture:
A Study of 114 MilitarM Patients Hospitalized Because of Aborive Suicide Attempts,
111 Ai. J. PSYCH. 33, 36 (1954). It has been hypothesized that attempts and insinceresuicide gestures are related to suicide, but that aggression in these cases has not been
internalized to the same extent Ibid. Menninger regards them as similar but has a dif-fer nt hypothesis to explain dissimilarities. MNNINGR 72.
34. See text at note 32 supra.
35. Success, for example, may to some individuals appear as an imposition of fur-
ther tasks to be fulfilled, and thus intensifies his awareness of his inferiority and hisne d for support for his self esteem. This frustr tion increases aggressive and guilt
feelings. See Facnoi 390-91. For another explanation of the same phenomenon, see
M 4NNIN gI 45-47.
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Out of the multitude of events capable of prompting suicide attempts
in almost all 6 cases in which evidence of such an attempt was admitted, the
courts could have been certain of only one potential causal event-the
jailing of the accused-yet jailing was never so much as considered as a pos-
sible cause. jailing was ignored notwithstanding that the Coudotte case
had previously excluded the evidence, where it was offered to corroborate
the testimony of confessed accomplices, because the defendant was an
Indian, a type known to react suicidally to confinement. It seems at least
as clear, however, that jailing can represent to one who is suicidally inclined
a loss of self-esteem and an increase in the need for regard from others,
to the same extent as may ill health or sudden financial success. Therefore,
such a person may resort to suicide upon being jailed, regardless of
whether he committed the crime for which he is being held.
It would be perfectly consistent with psychoanalytic theory to sup-
pose that some of those who attempt suicide in or out of jail do so because
they committed the crime for which they are subsequently tried.-3 Follow-
ing a murder, for example, the murderer's rage, having been deprived by
the homicide of the object of its gratification, may be turned by his con-
science back upon himself and expressed in suicide.38 It is possible that
psychoanalytic theory may even be said to confirm, in some instances, the
judicial analogy between suicide and flight as an attempt to escape punish-
ment, for suicide may in part result from a narcissistic desire to kill oneself
instead of being executed by others3 9 Nevertheless, in view of the myriad
of other events which might have prompted the suicide attempt, there is no
basis for assuming that an attempt tends to show that those who so act
are more likely to be guilty than those who do not. Without such an
affirmative showing, it is submitted that evidence of a suicide attempt
should be excluded as irrelevant.4°
On the basis of available knowledge of suicide, it would appear impos-
sible, without psychiatric examination of the accused, 4' for the state to
negate all motives other than consciousness of guilt in order to qualify
the evidence. However, in an exceptional case the prosecution may be
able to so delimit the possible suicidal motives that the attempt does tend
to add something to the likelihood that the defendant committed the act
with which he is charged. State v. Plunkett 2 suggests such an instance.
In that case, the defendant was found bleeding profusely from a slashed
wrist; his baby was discovered nearby, beaten to death. Remarks of the
accused indicated that the death of the child-by whomever caused-had
prompted his suicide attempt. Because the act of self-destruction was so
36. See notes 9 and 10 supra.
37. See note 44 infra.
38. M NNIMGmR 32.
39. Id. at 70.
40. See text and citations at notes 12 and 13 supra.
41. Cf. text at notes 16-35 supra.
42. 62 Nev. 258, 149 P.2d 101 (1944).
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clearly connected with the death of the child, the state had considerably
narrowed the range of suicide motives. The death of a loved one, from
whatever cause, appears to be a relatively frequent precipitant of suicide.
4 3
However, no statistical data are available revealing what proportion of
those who attempt suicide following the death of a loved one have them-
selves killed that loved one.44  Nevertheless, suicidal behavior under these
circumstances does indicate that the actor's attitude toward the deceased
was extremely ambivalent between love and hate.4 If the accused hated
the deceased, the likelihood that he killed the deceased is advanced.46 Con-
sequently, in this situation, assuming the validity of the psychological
theories employed, evidence of a suicide attempt is probably relevant to
legal guilt.47
Determining what weight this evidence should properly be given
is a more difficult question. While common knowledge is usually avail-
able to determine the probative value to be accorded evidence of criminal
motive, this source is not very helpful here. Moreover, expert knowledge
appears inconclusive. On one hand, clinical experience indicates that al-
though a person who commits suicide is driven by the motive to kill some-
one else, it is very rare that this motive results in his killing anyone but
himself.48 Thus, the evidence may appear to deserve very little weight.
43. As indicated in text and citations at notes 23-25 supra, the characteristic object
relationships of most suicidally-disposed types are ambivalent between love and hate.
Mourning becomes pathological if the relationship between the mourner and the lost
object was an extremely ambivalent one. As noted in notes 28 and 30 supra, identifica-
tion with the hated object is characteristic of suicides, and has a punitive significance:
"Because you have wished the other person to die, you have to die yourself." Moreover,
narcissistically-oriented persons, in the painful state of mourning, tend unconsciously
to reproach their dead friends for having brought them into this painful state. These
reactions create guilt feelings and remorse. See FENIcHEL 393-96.
44. Data are, however, available giving some indication of what proportion of those
who kill loved ones thereafter commit suicide. See WOLGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL
HOmIcIDE c. 15 (to be published by University of Pennsylvania Press 1957). Four
out of every one hundred who commit criminal homicide kill themselves, according to
a study conducted in Philadelphia. Ibid. In England, however, homicide-suicide cases
comprise 22%. Ibid. The Philadelphia study indicated that the chief criterion for dif-
ferentiation between homicides followed by, and those not followed by, suicide was
the degree of positive attachment between killer and victim. In 18 of 26 victim-offenddr
relationships, the victim was a relative of the offender, and in another 7, the victim
was the offender's paramour. Of total homicides, however, relatives and paramours
comprise only one-third of the victim offender relationships. Ibid. It also appears that
homicides by homicide-suicides were proportionately more violent than homicides in
general (violence being defined in terms of multiple killing injuries).
45. See note 43 supra.
46. It is well established that subsequent as well as prior evidences of hostility
will be admitted to prove criminal acts committed against the hated object. See cases
collected in 2 WiGmoRz, Evn Ncn §§ 395-97 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as WiG-
MORE).
47. If consideration is given to the hypothetical nature of the theories employed,
see note 7 supra, to demonstrate relevance, the evidence might reasonably be excluded
as irrelevant when offered by the prosecution. Because of the courts' strong presump-
tion of innocence in favor of the defense, cf. Demetree v. United States, 207 F.2d 892,
894 (5th Cir. 1953), psychiatric theories employed by the prosecution might be expected
to encounter somewhat stricter scrutiny than the same theories when propounded by
the accused.
48. Although the wish to kill may have been conscious, it will have been repressed,
disguised by a conscious attitude of love, protection, obedience. When such feelings of
19571
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On the other hand, this conclusion is justified only if the conduct of those
who complete suicide is sufficiently similar to those who merely attempt to
do so. However, a recent study of some people who were unsuccessful
in their suicide attempts revealed that a significant proportion of this
group was characterized by behavior overtly aggressive towards others.49
The study suggests that while suicide attempts involve psychological ele-
ments similar to those existent in completed suicides, the extent to which
the aggression in the former instance has been turned against the actor
is not equal to that involved in successful suicides.50 Although the attempt
indicates that the accused has aggressive tendencies which may be directed
against others, it cannot be concluded that all those who merely attempt
suicide are more likely to have killed another than those who actually
complete suicide. A suicide attempt in jail, for example, may be unsuc-
cessful not because of psychological factors but because the most efficient
means of self-destruction are not available to the inmate. Consequently,
unless it is shown that the attempt was unsuccessful because of the lack
of effective means to accomplish its objective, it would appear prejudicial
to regard the defendant as psychologically different from one who com-
pletes suicide. Moreover, if the above showing is not forthcoming, in
addition to denying added weight to the evidence of the attempt it also
seems plausible to give it even less weight than that normally accorded the
motive of hate, since the suicidal type will be more likely to respond to
his motivations by directing his aggression towards himself rather than
against others.
Because of the consistency of reported judicial rulings on the sub-
ject,51 in actual practice the burden is probably on the defense to justify
exclusion of the evidence, rather than on the prosecution to justify* its
introduction. Nevertheless, since these opinions have evidenced no exam-
ination of the mechanisms of suicide attempts,52 in a proper case the
defense, with the aid of a psychiatrist, may have a good chance to prevent
admission of the evidence by acquainting the judge with the results of
studies of suicide attempts generally which negate the relevance of attempts
to the guilt of the accused. In addition, the psychiatrist may be able to
offer an affirmative theory to explain the suicide attempt on some ground
other than the accused's desire to escape deserved punishment.ba If the
hostility are not permitted to the person's conscience, the individual manifests not ag-
gression but guilt feelings. See FaZuD, CIVILIZATION AND ITs DisCONTWTS c. 7 (1930)
MENNINGER 57-58; text at notes 29-31 supra.
49. Of 114 attempted suicides hospitalized at the United States Naval Hospital,
Philadelphia, during 1951, almost a fifth were guardhouse prisoners. Fisch, supra note
33, at 36.
50. Ibid. See also discussion in note 33 supra.
51. See note 9 supra.
52. Notable exception: State v. Coudotte, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N.W. 913 (1897), dis-
cussing the cultural determinants of suicide among American Indians.
53. Psychiatric investigation is available to lawyers involved in cases in which sui-
cide is a feature, at least in our larger metropolitan areas. It is estimated that four to
ten hours, at twenty to twenty-five dollars Der hour, would be necessary. LvIN, Evi-
DXNC AND TiH BzHAVIORAL SCMNCES C-35 (mimeo. 1956). Time for the doctor to
travel to the hospital room or prison would probably be charged at the same rate.
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evidence cannot thereby be excluded, expert testimony might be employed
to rebut the inference that the accused was so motivated, by showing alter-
native motives inferrable either from psychiatric knowledge of suicide
generally or from an examination of the accused himselfY4
ADMISSIBILITY IN PROSECUTION FOR HOMICIDE OF DECLARATIONS BY THE
ALLEGED VICTIM INDICATING SUICIDAL DISPOSITION
In prosecutions for homicide where the accused alleges that the
deceased committed suicide, declarations or threats by the deceased in-
dicating a suicidal disposition have generally been admitted as tending to
show that his subsequent death resulted from suicide.55 The assumption
that threats tend to show suicide has some support in clinical findings. In
studies conducted among patients undergoing psychiatric treatment, those
expressing suicide thoughts were generally found not only much more
severely disturbed than patients who had shown no suicidal tendencies but
also much more disturbed than patients who had actually, but unsuccess-
fully, attempted suicideY6 Although the suicide rate among those who
threaten suicide has not yet been effectively measured,57 these studies
indicate that it is probably much greater than among non-threatening
patients.58 If threats thus increase the likelihood of suicide among
psychiatric patients, it is probable that threats have similar significance
among non-patients. However, since clinical experience indicates that
exceedingly few of those who threaten suicide actually commit it," the
probative weight of this evidence is but slight.
Most courts which have admitted evidence of threats have also condi-
tioned admissibility on a showing that: (1) the circumstances of death were
as consistent with suicide as with homicide, and (2) the declarations were
made within a reasonable time before death.60 In ruling on the first of
these conditions, the courts have not always made clear the underlying
assumptions upon which their decisions have rested. For example, in a
recent Pennsylvania case, the court regarded the fact that the deceased
54. For the admissibility in homicide cases of suicide plans of the alleged victim,
see pp. 399-402 infra, and of suicide motives of the alleged victim, see cases cited in 1
WIGMORE § 144.
55. See cases cited in 1 id. § 143 n.1. Though hearsay, such statements are regarded
as within the exception for design, plan or mental condition. 1 id. § 79.
56. Farberow, Personality Patterns of Suicidal Mental Hospital Patients, 42 GlN-
ItrC PsYcH. MONOGR.as 3, 79 (1950) ; Rosen, Hales & Simon, Classification of "Sui-
cidal" Patients, 18 J. CONSULT. PSYCH. 359-62 (1954) ; cf. note 33 supra.
57. Rosen, Detection of Suicidal Patients: An Exaample of Some Limitations in
the Prediction of Infrequent Events, 18 J. CONSULT. PsYcHr. 397 (1954).
58. Note that the suicidd rate for psychiatric patients is approximately .0033, ibid.;
for the population in general, .000099, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, DFr'T OF Cot-
sR.Rcz, STATisTicAL. ABsTRAcT o THn UNiTz STATxs 70 (1956); or a ratio of about
thirty-three to one.
59. Rosen, supra note 57, at 397-98.
60. E.g., Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N.E. 961 (1892) ; Sutter
v. State, 102 Neb. 321, 167 N.W. 66 (1918).
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landed head first after falling from a window as inconsistent with suicide.6 '
Apparently, the premise was that all such suicides hit the ground feet first.
Such a view, however, ignores the fact that suicides have involved almost
every conceivable method of self-destruction. 62  Even if the court's premise
had been indisputable, the justification for this requirement, if any, would
depend on assumptions about facilitating an orderly trial procedure rather
than on any interpretation of the psychology of suicide. A court which
concedes that threats increase the probability of a subsequent suicide, and
nevertheless excludes such evidence because the circumstances of death
made suicide seem physically unfeasible, is assuming that the jury should
not be burdened with relevant evidence when the fact which that eVidence
tends to show has been rendered unlikely by other evidence. It is sub-
mitted that, as Wigmore has suggested in his discussion of suicide threats,6
the function of balancing relevant facts against each other is normally as-
signed to the jury. Conforming to this theory, the admissibility of suicide
threats should not be affected by other evidence relating to the probability
that suicide accounted for the subsequent death. Evidence concerning
improbability should be made a matter for rebuttal alone.
Where the second requirement-reasonable proximity in time-has
been invoked for admissibility of suicide threats, the courts have not always
agreed what constitutes a reasonable time. Six years was not too long
for one court,64 although two weeks was too long for another." Whether
the time interval should affect admissibility, and if so, what time lengths
should be considered significant, depends almost entirely on assumptions
about the nature and frequency of suicide. A court that would include
a threat made two hours before death but exclude one made two weeks
before, makes two assumptions which, if accurate, destroy the relevance
of the latter declaration: first, that suicidal tendencies tend to diminish
rather than increase with the passage of time; second, that such diminution
is so marked that a person who threatens suicide two hours before his death
is more likely to have committed suicide than one who has not so threatened
or whose threat was made at an earlier time, whereas a person who
threatens suicide two weeks before his death is no more likely to accom-
plish the act than one who has not made such threat.
61. Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 50, 103 A.2d 694, 696 (1954) ; cf. Lee
v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 116, 226 S.W.2d 759 (1950) (death caused by strychnine
poisoning; general finding that "the facts" do not indicate suicide in any way).
62. For a collection of bizarre methods, see Kennan, Problems of Suicide, 31 Mc-
Clure's Magazine, June 1908, pp. 218, 227 (e.g., self-cremation is comparatively com-
mon). Nevertheless some methods are much more frequent than others. E.g., a recent
study found asphyxia (34%) and firearms (30%) the most frequent. Schmid & Van
Arsdal, Completed and Attempted Suicides: A Comparative Analysis, 20 Am. Soc.
REv. 273, 280-81 (1955).
63. 1 WmoMRE § 143.
64. Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872); cf. People v. Conklin, 175 N.Y.
333, 67 N.E. 624 (1903) (three years) ; Bowie v. State, 185 Ark. 834, 49 S.W.2d 1049
(1932) (two months).
65. Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 103 A.2d 694 (1954). However, the
court's ruling was probably based primarily on logical rather than temporal remoteness.
See note 77 infra; cf. State v. Kelly, 77 Conn. 266, 58 Atl. 705 (1904) (one year).
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It is clear that suicidal tendencies do change with the passage of time.
Suicide is the result of both external pressures on the individual and the
internal resistance of which his personality is capable8 6 Although an
individual's predispositions to suicide may change under the impact of
external events, 6 7 the change is as likely to be toward suicide as away
from it,"" depending on the nature of these events. Consequently, the
suicide rate among those who threaten is not likely to be sufficiently changed
by the passage of time to bring that rate below the rate for a comparable
group of non-threateners. It is therefore submitted that the evidence ought
to be admitted without regard to its remoteness 9 Of course, in an in-
dividual case, passage of time can be significant when related to intervening
events which would have strengthened the deceased's ability to avoid self-
destruction. However, as was suggested above, evidence concerning the
improbability of suicide should not preclude evidence of its probability,
but should be restricted to rebuttal.
As a practical matter, defense counsel may have to contend with un-
favorable judicial precedent as to what constitutes a reasonable time in-
terval.7°  However, these precedents are not insurmountable. First, they
apparently were arrived at on the basis of common knowledge, and recent
findings in the statistical and clinical disciplines justify some scepticism
of such a foundation. For example, common knowledge, as expressed by
the courts, considers those who attempt suicide as more likely to have sub-
sequently done so than those who "merely" threaten suicide.71 Expert
knowledge, as noted above,72 indicates the contrary. While this expert
knowledge may not be entirely objectively verified, 73 and deductions from
it not entirely refined, 74 some courts may regard the defendant in a criminal
case as entitled to the benefit of the doubt in questions not only of burden
of proof 75 but also of relevance. 76 Consequently, the time barrier might
be overcome on the basis of general psychiatric theory.
Second, the courts have shown a willingness to regard longer periods
as reasonable when a logical connection is shown between the circum-
66. See text and citations at notes 16-35 supra.
67. Cf., e.g., the demonstrated effect of business failure noted in DUBLIN, TH r
FAcTS or Li r 264-65 (1951).
68. Cf. F4NicHEL 401: "The factors, doubtlessly quantitative in nature, that de-
termine whether or when the result [of depression] is to be a suicide, a maniac attack,
or a recovery are still unknown."
69. Cf. the treatment given homicide threats, which are admissible against the
accused without regard to the passage of time between the threat and the killing. 7
WIGooRZ § 108.
70. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 103 A.2d 694 (1954) (two
weeks).
71. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N.E. 961 (1892) ; cf.
Lee v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 116, 226 S.W.2d 759 (1950).
72. See note 56 supra.
73. See note 7 supra.
74. See text at notes 56-59 and 67-69 supra.
75. Cf., e.g., Demetree v. United States, 207 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir. 1953).
76. Cf. note 47 supra.
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stances prompting the threat and those surrounding the subsequent
suicide . 7  To a skilled observer most suicides can be seen to have mani-
fested their intention well before death.78 Therefore, with the aid of a
psychiatrist, evidence of the deceased's behavior may be uncovered from
which some theory can be developed to establish the likelihood that his
death resulted from suicide, and to locate the immediate and long-range
reasons for his self-destruction. Facts tending to show a theory of suicide
appear to be admissible, the courts having admitted, for example, the
pregnancy of a single woman 79 and exhibitions of melancholy.80  More-
over, in those jurisdictions where the defendant bears the risk of non-
persuasion in establishing suicide,8 ' it becomes imperative for some theory
of suicide to be developed, since the weight properly attributable to threats
by themselves would not be sufficient to affirmatively establish suicide.
ADmISSIBILITY OF THIRD-PARTY SUICIDE NOTES AS AN EXCEPTION TO
THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY
Those who commit suicide frequently leave notes explaining the events
which induced their self-destruction. On occasion these explanations may
be relevant to the legal rights of others. For example, the deceased may
admit in a note the theft of valuables and, in addition, exculpate someone
else who had previously been accused of the theft, or inculpate another
as an accomplice, or perhaps indicate a donee to whom the valuables may
be traced. So far as these persons are concerned, the contents of the
suicide note constitute hearsay evidence. Whether the evidence will never-
theless be admissible s2 has been primarily a function of judicial treatment
of those statements as possessing the same degree of reliability as legal
precedent attributes to declarations which subject the declarant to criminal
77. Compare Commonwealth v. Santos, 275 Pa. 515, 119 Atl. 596 (1923) (four
weeks reasonable), zuith Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 103 A.2d 694 (1954)
(two weeks unreasonable). The court in the latter case emphasized that the defense had
shown no logical connection between the circumstances which prompted the threat
(denial of a job) and the circumstances which allegedly prompted the suicide (sug-
gestion by the accused that illicit intercourse be repeated).
78. Such observations would not, however, be conclusive. The low incidence of
suicide has in itself been a major limitation in the development of an effective suicide
detection device, for in the attempt to predict suicide, it has been found that a large
number of false positives are obtained (people incorrectly classified as suicides). Rosen,
supra note 57, at 402.
79. Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N.E. 961 (1892).
80. Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872) ; Boyd v. State, 82 Tenn. (14 Lea)
161 (1844).
81. For a discussion of the burden of proving the "defense" of suicide, as well as
the hearsay problem presented by decedent's declaration, see 28 Txmp. L.Q. 143 (1954).
82. Statements made by a person not under oath nor subject to cross examination
are labeled hearsay and inadmissible, if the relevancy of the statement depends on its
veracity. 5 WIGMORE § 1362; UNIFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE rules 62-63. But numerous
well-defined exceptions admit certain hearsay statements which experience has shown
more likely to be trustworthy because of the circumstances under which they are made.
5 WIGMORE §§ 1420-26. Among these well-established exceptions is one that sanctions
the admissibility of statements by third persons of facts which are adverse to their
interest.
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or pecuniary liability,3 Very little consideration has been given to the
fact that the declarant was about to commit suicide. Thus, the admis-
sibility of third-party suicide notes has depended almost entirely on inter-
pretation of the rules justifying admission of declarations against interest
as an exception to the hearsay rule,8 4 and only by implication on any
interpretation of the psychology of suicide.
The admissibility of statements adverse to the interests of the declarant
is justified on the theory that experience indicates there exists a greater
likelihood of trustworthiness in such statements than in some other forms
of hearsay.8 Nevertheless, it is usually a prerequisite to admissibility that
the declarant be unavailable and that the statement be against his pecuniary
or proprietary interest.8 6 In addition, it must be demonstrated that he
was aware of this adverse effect and that he harbored no motive prompting
a false statement.8 7 Although some advocate that penal liability should be
considered as properly adverse along with pecuniary and proprietary
interests,88 the majority of Anglo-American jurisdictions reject penal in-
terest as insufficiently adverse to qualify as an exception to the hearsay
rule.8 9 Declarations against interest are admissible to prove not only the
disserving fact but also other facts contained in statements collateral to the
disserving statement.9 0 While some collateral statements are excluded,
they are generally admissible when shown not to be self-serving.9 1
Suicide notes have been offered in evidence as declarations against in-
terest in at least three situations. In the first, its introduction is sought
by the accused as evidence that the deceased committed the offense for
which the accused is charged. In Brennan v. State 92 the court, finding the
note to be against the suicide's penal interest, held it admissible.93 The
court regarded the declaration's reliability as further guaranteed by the
fact that the defendant was, at the least, but slightly known to the deceased,
and, at the most, his enemy, so that there existed no motive to falsify in
the defendant's favor.94
83. Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 Atl. 148 (1926) ; Truelsch v. Miller, 186
Wisc. 239, 202 N.W. 352 (1925) ; Commonwealth v. Antonini, 165 Pa. Super. 501, 69
A.2d 436 (1949) ; cf. Scott County v. Fluke, 34 Iowa 317 (1872).
84. See cases cited at note 83 .mtpra.
85. See note 82 supra.
86. See Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An. Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 58 HARv. L. Rzv. 1 (1944) and cases cited therein.
87. Ibid.
88. See United States v. Donnelly, 228 U.S. 243, 277 (1913) (dissenting opinion);
5 WicGoitz § 1476.
89. See Morgan, Declarations Against Interest in Texas, 10 TzxAs L. Rlv. 399,
409 (1932).
90. See Jefferson, supra note 86, at 59-62 and cases cited therein.
91. Ibid. See also, e.g., "neutral statements" in Turner v. Turner, 123 Ga. 5, 50 S.E.
969 (1905) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strauch, 179 Okla. 617, 67 P.2d 452 (1937).
92. 151 Md. 265, 134 Atl. 148 (1926) (conviction of bastardy reversed).
93. Cf. Scott County v. Fluke, 34 Iowa 317 (1872), admitting the suicide's
declarations to exculpate the defendant in a civil suit based on embezzlement where
these declarations were not in a note but were made verbally in connection with suicide
thoughts.
94. The court also emphasized that the note was found in the deceased's handwrit-
ing, and on his body.
1957]
404 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
In the second situation, the note is offered by a plaintiff seeking to
impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of a life insurance policy. The
note, in this instance, indicates that the insured paid his premiums with
money stolen from plaintiff. In Truelsch v. Miller 95 the court supported
admission of the note because the assertions were against the declarant's
penal and pecuniary interests. Moreover, it was observed that even if the
statements revealing the disposition of the stolen funds were regarded as
collateral to the disserving statements about the thefts, the statements about
disposition were not self-serving to the deceased. -
In the third situation, the prosecution seeks to introduce a note
wherein, in addition to the deceased's admission that he participated in the
offense for which the accused is charged, the accused is named as an ac-
complice. Such a note was excluded in Commonwealth v. Antonini 9 6 be-
cause the court refused to recognize penal interests as sufficiently adverse,
and also because the inculpating collateial matter was regarded as acquiring
no reliability from its connection with the disserving statements.
97
With the possible exception of the Brennan case,98 none of these
courts explicitly considered of any consequence declarant's suicidal intent
when the notes were written. It appears to have been assumed that con-
fessions of crime are as much against present interest as if the declarant
suicide-to-be envisaged a normal future when he wrote the damaging words.
This approach, however, is not peculiar to the suicide situation. The
courts appear never to have attached any significance, in connection with
declarations against interest, to the fact that declarant knew his death to be
imminent.99
Psychiatric findings are not necessary to appreciate that assertions in
suicide notes may not offer the same safeguards of the writer's sincerity
as are normally assumed to exist in declarations against penal or pecuniary
interests. When declarant knows that he will not be present to respond
to prosecution or civil suit, impending liability cannot be considered a
motivating impetus ensuring trustworthiness. Of course, some suicides
arise from a mere gesture at self-destruction which, for reasons beyond the
deceased's control,100 unexpectedly resulted in a "successful" attempt. In
95. 186 Wisc. 239, 202 N.W. 352 (1925).
96. 165 Pa. Super. 501, 69 A.2d 436 (1949) (on appeal by Commonwealth grant of
new trial by lower court en banc following conviction for embezzlement affirmed).
97. The court's assertion that the collateral statements could not be admissible has
been interpreted as creating a new category of collateral statements, based on some
privilege which the court seemed to feel exists for defendants in criminal prosecutions
in connection with the accusations of co-conspirators. See Note, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 755
(1950).
98. The court in the Brennan case, however, seems implicitly to have assumed that
a suicide about to die will not lie about the cause of his death. "Of course, if the de-
fendant fails at the retrial of the case to prove that the letter found on the deceased
contained an admission of guilt and assigned this guilt as the reason for his rash abt,
then neither the fact of the suicide nor the verbal admissions of guilt by the deceased
prior to his death would be admissible." 151 Md. at 272-73, 134 Atl. at 151. (Emphasis
added.)
99. See cases cited in Jefferson, supra note 86, at 55-56.
100. See text and citations at note 33 mipra.
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such cases it would appear that the deceased actually contemplated surviving
and being required to account for his misdeeds. However, these declara-
tions, although against his interest, should not therefore be regarded as
reliable. The aggressive drives of some who behave suicidally are as likely
to lead them to falsely inculpate third persons as the guilt feelings of other
suicidal types are likely to lead them to falsely exculpate others. 1' 1 These
drives, by establishing a motive to falsify, preclude such notes from comply-
ing with a necessary prerequisite for admissibility of declarations against
interest. 02
It has been suggested that even though suicide notes do not qualify
as declarations against interest according to the recognized rules, admis-
sion of such evidence might nevertheless be justified by the reliability
derived through the declaration's adverse effect on the pecuniary interest
of the declarant's family.'03 The assumption is that a suicide is unlikely
to make false statements which are apt to result in unfounded claims
against his estate and thereby lessen the amount of his property to be
enjoyed by his family on his death. While this assumption may be appli-
cable to "reasonable men," there is no certainty that it accurately reflects
the conduct of suicidal types. It is true that most suicides are regarded
psychiatrically as in part developing from an individual's effort to appease
a tyrannical conscience, which might demand that he protect the interests
of his family.104 However, the suicidal personality involves also an aggres-
sive element which need not be completely internalized and may in fact
be directed against the actor's family through a suicide note which will
cause them a pecuniary as well as an emotional loss at his passing.10 5
Another theory of admission which may be advanced is that the deceased's
interest in his good name and reputation guarantees reliability to any
suicide notes disparaging his reputation. Here too is a proposition which
may be generally sound but inapplicable to suicides, since such persons
characteristically engage in exaggerated or groundless self-depreciation.' °O
Finally, it might be urged that the evidence could be'admitted by con-
sidering suicide notes reliable for the same reasons as are dying declara-
tions.1°r The assumption here is that one aware of impending death will
not lie, at least not about the reason for his death. Whatever may be the
101. See note 22 supra.
102. See text at note 87 supra.
103. Cf. Jefferson, supra note 86, at 57.
104. See text at notes 26 and 27 supra. See also Fr~icxri 400.
105. Ibid.; see text at note 32 supra. See also the suicidal fantasies of neurotically
depressed children, the love-blackmailing tendency of which is obvious: "When I am
dead the parents will regret what they have done to me and will love me again."
Bender & Schilder, Suicidal Preoccupations and Attempts in Children, 7 Am. J.
ORTHoPsYcH. 225 (1937).
106. See notes 28 and 30 supra.
107. Declarations of one who is conscious of impending death and who subse-
quently dies are admitted in homicide cases insofar as they relate to the circumstances
of the killing and to the events more or less nearly preceding it in time and leading
up to it. See cases cited in McCoRmicr. §§ 259-60.
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usual validity of that assumption, it seems inapplicable to suicides in view
of their characteristic aggressive and guilt feelings.
Thus, it appears reasonable to conclude that whether or not a suicide
note can be formally characterized as a declaration against either pecuniary
or penal interests, such a note cannot be regarded as of general trust-
worthiness. The sharp categories in which the courts have defined the
special situations in which hearsay proof should be allowed are said to
be based in part on the particular reliability of declarations made in these
situations.1 0 8  Moreover, even those reform authorities who would by-pass
these categories have continued to require reliability, in that admissibility is
made to depend on a finding that the declaration was made in good faith.'0 9
Consequently, to be consistent with either approach third-party suicide
notes should be excluded.
SUICIDE AND SANITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING RIGHTS UNDER
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTES
Numerous cases in the workmen's compensation field have involved
death claims by the survivor of an employee who committed suicide al-
legedly as the result of an accidental physical injury incurred in the course
of his employment.110 Not all of these self-inflicted deaths have been held
compensable, however. Even though the accidental injury was acknowl-
edged to be the event that actually triggered the suicide, several doctrinal
approaches have been successfully employed in resisting these claims. The
most frequent has been reliance on the provisions of forty-one state
statutes "I which exclude from coverage "intentional" self-injury." 2 Re-
covery has also been denied on the theory that suicide is an independent
intervening cause, obviating the accidental physical injury as the proximate
cause of death.1la With each of these approaches denial of compensation
108. See note 82 supra.
109. See, e.g., Mass. Acts 1898, c. 535; UNIFoi RULES OF EVIDENcF- rule
63 (4) (c). But cf. MCCORMICK 627, suggesting that as a precondition to admissibility
only the unavailability of the declarant and the accuracy of the declaration's trans-
mission be required.
110. See cases cited at notes 110-22 infra. Note that, as in other connections, a
pre-existing weakness in the form of neurotic tendency does not lessen the compensa-
bility of an injury which precipitates a disabling neurosis. E.g., Farran v. Curtis Pub-
lishing Co., 276 Pa. 553, 120 Atl. 544 (1923) ; Jacobson v. Department of Labor and
Industries, 37 Wash. 2d 444, 224 P.2d 338 (1950).
111. The state statutes which make no specific reference to suicide or intentional
self-injury are those of Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan, 'Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire and Wyoming.
112. See, e.g., Kasman v. Hillman Coal & Coke Co., 149 Pa. Super. 263, 27 A.2d
762 (1942) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio St. 617, 196 N.E. 409 (1935).
There is also statutory basis for the argument that workmen's compensation benefits
extend only to "accidental" injuries, whereas suicide is intentional. The requirement that
the injury be accidental in character has been adopted either legislatively or judicially
by all but four states: California, Iowa, Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Rhode Island
deleted the requirement by R.I. LAWS 1949, c. 2282. 1 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S CONE-
PENSATIoN 511 n.1 (1952).
113. See, e.g., Sponatski's Case, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915); Barber v.
Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 462, 6 N.W.2d 199 (1942).
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for the suicide of an injured workman would seem to depend upon whether
the act should be considered "intentional."
Most American decisions have purported to employ two tests, or
variations thereof, to determine whether the self-destructive act at issue
was intended.114 Death is said to be compensable when the suicide is
either (1) the product of a delusion or otherwise without the deceased's
knowledge of the physical consequences of his act; or (2) the result of
an uncontrollable impulse, or otherwise without volition.115 Although the
cases are purportedly so decided, and thus theoretically should be classifiable
as compensable only if the employee killed himself under either of the above
circumstances and as non-compensable if the employee knew what he was
doing and was able to consciously control his behavior, in fact, however, a
different pattern of decision emerges from the cases. The compensable
cases are frequently marked by a particularly exhibitionist or eccentric
method of self-destruction, while the non-compensable cases usually involve
a quiet melancholy leading to a solitary and undramatic death. 1 6 For
example, the courts have permitted recovery without substantial evidence
of defects either of the will or of the intellect where the deceased, during
hospitalization for physical injury, silently leaped from a window in the
presence of his nurse;117 where he became enraged at a trivial slight,
assaulted his step-daughter, and then rushed out and hanged himself; 118
and where he stubbornly starved himself to death.119 With similar evi-
dence of volition and cognition, compensation was denied where the de-
ceased wrote four eloquent suicide notes before shooting himself; 120 where
he traveled to Canada and committed suicide in a lonely hotel room; 121 and
where he waited until his family had gone to Sunday school before com-
mitting the act.12
114. But cf. New York cases discussed at note 115 infra.
115. The formula most often found is that of Sponatski's Case, 220 Mass. 526, 530,
108 N.E. 466, 468 (1915) : Compensation for death will be made "where there follows
as the direct result of a physical injury an insanity of such violence as to cause the
victim to take his own life through an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of
frenzy, without conscious volition to produce death, having knowledge of the physical
v..consequences of the act.... ." See also, e.g., Widdis v. Collingdale Millwork Co., 169
Pa. Super. 612, 84 A.2d 259 (1951); McKane v. Capital Hill Quarry Co., 100 Vt. 45,
134 Atl. 640 (1926). Some courts may emphasize one or the other of the two standards.
Compare Kazazian v. Segan, 14 N.J. Misc. 78, 182 Atl. 351 (Dep't of Lab. & Work-
men's Comp. 1936), with McFarland v. Department of Labor and Industries, 188 Wash.
357, 62 P.2d 714 (1936). But cf. the courts of New York which in recent cases appear
to have supplemented these standards with a condition that the suicide shall have been
caused by a mental disease. Maricle v. Glazier, 283 App. Div. 402, 128 N.Y.S.2d 148
(3d Dep't 1954) ; Pushkarowitz v. A. & M. Kramer, 275 App. Div. 875, 88 N.Y.S.2d
885 (3d Dep't 1949), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 637, 90 N.E.2d 494 (1950). The New York
approach would thus seem to correspond closely to the English requirements. See, e.g.,
Withers v. London, Brighton & S. Coast Ry., [1916] 2 K.B. 772.
116. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 505 (1952) and cases cited at notes 117-
21 infra.
117. Gasperin v. Consolidated Coal Co., 293 Pa. 589, 143 Atl. 187 (1928).
118. McFarland v. Department of Labor and Industries, 188 Wash. 357, 62 P.2d
714 (1936).
119. Sinclair's Case, 248 Mass. 414, 143 N.E. 330 (1924).
120. Widdis v. Collingdale Millwork Co., 169 Pa. Super. 612, 84 A.2d 259 (1951).
121. Barber v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 462, 6 N.W.2d 199 (1942).
122. Industrial Comm'n v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio St. 617, 196 N.E. 409 (1935).
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It seems improbable that the disparity between the test's statement and
its application is due to judicial unfamiliarity with the concepts employed,
since comparable formulae control similar questions in insurance and crim-
inal law.m Moreover, the issue posed by the first test, whether deceased
knew the physical consequences of his act, is one of fact which can be
readily determined. Analysis of the deceased's conduct prior to his death,
by laymen as well as by experts, can establish with reasonable certainty
whether the individual was substantially disoriented from reality. Admin-
istration of the irresistible impulse test, however, is of greater difficulty.
Whether there are impulses and unconscious drives that overwhelm some
individuals is not the problem; most psychiatrists would readily admit that
they exist.'2 4 The real difficulty is in drawing the fine line distinguishing
individuals whose actions are thus controlled from those whose are not.'2
Even if the actor were available for analysis, an accurate performance of
this task would be exceedingly difficult; in his absence, it would appear
virtually impossible.22 With the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show
accidental injury, if the traditional test were literally followed there would
be virtually no instances of compensation where death was allegedly the
product of an irresistible impulse.
It may be supposed that the response of the courts in sometimes allow-
ing compensation in cases involving bizarre conduct preceding suicide,
without more than the slightest suggestion of cognitive or volitional im-
pairment, represents a rudimentary sense of justice which requires the
employer to pay for his worker's eventual suicide when the worker was
driven "crazy," though not otherwise. Indeed, the New York courts in
recent cases have explicitly supplemented the traditional standards with
the rule that the compensation will be granted when the suicide was the
product of a "psychosis." 127 But this may not be helpful, for in many
instances the psychosis cannot be affirmatively established without direct
examination of the individual,128 a method which is precluded in suicide
cases. In any event, the difficulty with a standard, implicit or explicit,
123. In a minority of jurisdictions, in suits to recover on accident and life insurance
policies it has been held that the standard exclusion of suicide, "sane or insane," does
not exclude self-inflicted death without cognition, because such death is indistinguish-
able from accidental death, which is covered. See 1 APPLEMAN, INsuRANcE § 363 n.38
(1941). Following the rule in the M'Naughton case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (H.L.
1843), the same standards are used to determine criminal responsibility, except in the
District of Columbia, Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; New
Hampshire, State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869) and possibly New Mexico, State v.
White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954).
124. In a poll of members of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry on
this question, ninety per cent answered in the affirmative. Guttmacher, Principal Dif-
ficulties With the Present Criteria of Responsibility and Possible Alterations, MODXL
PiwAIL ConE 170, 174 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
125. Ibid.
126. Cf. ibid.
127. See note 115 supra.
128. The chief difference, medically, between neurosis and psychosis is the extent
to which the individual loses ability to test reality, i.e., to perceive, integrate and
realistically act upon events taking place in the world. ENGLISHr & FINCH, INTRODUC-
THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SUICIDE
which depends on whether the worker was "crazy" is that virtually all
suicidal individuals in our society are probably severely disturbed.'2 9
If some courts have felt compelled to expand workmen's compensation
coverage beyond the strict limits of unintentional self-destruction, then the
source of the disparity between some findings and any consistent standard
related to mental health becomes clear. Caught between a statutory term 130
which would almost always deny compensation and a sense of justice
which would almost always require compensation, in reconciling these
influences some judges and arbitration boards will favor one course, some
the other. If this supposition is true, theoretically inconsistent decisions
in suicide compensation proceedings may be expected to continue until
the statutes are amended to include or to exclude all suicides, sane or
insane.
However, any proposal to include all suicides would have to overcome
the objection that giving compensation for self-inflicted injuries may en-
courage such injuries. Psychiatric theory would seem to indicate that
in some cases knowledge that dependent survivors would be cared for
might operate as one of the complex of factors inducing suicide.-3 ' How-
ever, actual encouragement represented by the possibility of compensation
is probably not significant. Because of the suicide's unconscious hostility
toward his loved ones, in as many cases as it operates as an inducement,
it probably has a deterrent effect.182 Moreover, the prospect of compensa-
tion is but one of a variety of factors influencing the suicide M so that
the possibility of suicide is not likely to be affected by awarding or denying
compensation, whereas both the accident in the course of employment and
the basic social need which prompted the enactment of these benefits
continue to exist.
CONCLUSION
Judicial assumptions about suicide developed at a time when expert
knowledge of the subject was more limited than at *present. Moreover,
the courts' interpretations of suicide were only rarely founded on a con-
sidered application of that knowledge which was then current. Notwith-
standing advances in expert understanding, recent cases have, through
adherence to precedent, preserved the older assumptions. Yet, between
TION TO PSYCHIATRY 43-44 (1950) ; cf. ALEXANDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOANAL-
Ysis 18-20 (1948). However, it is clear that in some individuals significant mistaken
perceptions and interpretations need not always have been unequivocably manifested
to observers.
129. See text and citations at notes 21-33 supra.
130. The proximate cause defense is avoided more simply than the statutory one.
If the second cause is a natural and foreseeable consequence of the first cause, it has
been argued that the second cause, the suicide, is not an independent intervening force.
See Barber v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 462, 467, 6 N.W.2d 199, 202 (1942) (dis-
senting opinion).
131. See text at note 104 supra.
132. See text at note 105 supra.
133. See text and citations at notes 21-33 supra.
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these assumptions and socio-psychiatric views there would appear to be the
following areas of substantial divergence:
(1) The suicide attempt of an accused between the time of his al-
leged crime and his trial has uniformly been admitted against him on the
theory that it shows deserved remorse or a desire to escape deserved.
punishment. Expert knowledge, on the contrary, indicates that, in view
of the great variety and apparent inadequacy of the circumstances capable
of prompting suicidal behavior, evidence of attempts is not relevant to legal
guilt.
(2) Courts assume that suicide thoughts or threats tend to show that
the cause of the threatener's subsequent death was suicide. The learned
literature tends to confirm the relevancy of threats, though it indicates that
they are entitled to very little weight. Courts have also assumed that
suicidal tendencies tend to diminish with the passage of time, so that the
admissibility of threats should be conditioned on proximity to the time
of death. However, expert understanding suggests that changes in an
individual's predispositions to suicide are as likely to be toward it as
away from it, depending on intervening events. Consequently, the evi-
dence should be admitted without regard to time.
(3) The contents of suicide notes have sometimes been admitted, on
the basis of rules justifying admission of declarations against interest as
exceptions to the rule against hearsay, without explicit consideration of
the effective suicidal intent of the declarant. However, expert knowl-
edge indicates that not only do such notes not satisfy the formal re-
quirements of these rules, but also that they are likely to be unreliable.
Consequently, such declarations should not be admissible.
(4) In ruling on workmen's compensation claims based on suicide,
many courts appear to have been reluctant to confine themselves to the strict
statutory standard of "intention," but have granted compensation on a
showing of dramatically abnormal behavior. Expert findings indicate that
any implicit standard based on whether the worker was driven "crazy"
is unworkable, since virtually all suicides in our society are probably
severely disturbed. Consequently, conflicting results may be anticipated
until the statutes expressly include or exclude all suicides, sane or insane.
M.M.D.
